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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Once again during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued
several significant decisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction and gov-
ernmental immunity. In City of Galveston v. State, a sharply divided su-
preme court ruled that Texas cities have immunity even from claims
brought by the State itself.1 Despite the supreme court's recent pro-
nouncement "that 'all governmental immunity derives from the State,' "2
the majority rejected the idea that the State "gave" immunity to cities. 3
Rather, cities were created by the Constitution and the consent of their
inhabitants, and their immunity "arose as a common-law creation of the
judiciary."'4 Thus, while the State has the power to waive cities' immunity
from suit, the majority held that it has no authority to do so without the
unequivocal consent of the legislature. 5
Texas A & M University System v. Koseoglu addressed a plaintiff's right
to cure jurisdictional pleading defects following an interlocutory appeal.6
The supreme court found that the plaintiff was entitled to stand on his
pleadings in the face of a plea to the jurisdiction until the appellate court
ruled against him, at which time he would ordinarily be granted an oppor-
tunity to amend his pleadings. 7 But the supreme court went on to hold
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1. City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2007).
2. Id. at 474 (quoting Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 345 (Tex. 2006)).
3. Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 473.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 471. The dissent argued that the city's immunity was derivative of the State's
and, therefore, "[I]ike a teenager's allowance, [it] rises or falls (or disappears) on the sover-
eign's whim and benevolence." Id. at 480 (Willett, J., dissenting).
6. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. 2007).
7. Id. at 839-40.
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that a plaintiff need only be afforded this opportunity if it is possible to
cure the pleading defect; in this case the defect was incurable, and it
would serve no purpose to order a remand.8
In a case involving the jurisdictional limits of a county court at law,
United Services Auto Association v. Brite posed the question of whether
the amount in controversy excludes damages that are speculative or un-
certain. 9 Having obtained a judgment in his age-discrimination suit for
approximately $1 million, the plaintiff argued that his suit nevertheless
fell within the $100,000 jurisdictional limit of the county court because, at
the time he filed suit, certain elements of the damages he claimed were
speculative and should have been excluded from the calculation of the
amount in controversy.10 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding
instead that the amount in controversy includes all damages the plaintiff
seeks to recover unless expressly excluded by the jurisdictional statute
itself."1
The Texas Supreme Court also explored the role of civil courts in adju-
dicating tort actions arising out of church discipline in Westbrook v. Pen-
ley.12 The plaintiff in this case sued the pastor of her church, who was
also a licensed professional counselor, for negligence and various inten-
tional torts after he disclosed the plaintiff's extramarital affair to the
church congregation. The plaintiff claimed she provided this information
to the defendant as part of a purely secular counseling session, a claim
which the supreme court accepted as true for purposes of its decision.
The defendant nevertheless argued that the disclosure was in accordance
with church's internal disciplinary procedures, and therefore the plain-
tiff's claims were not within the jurisdiction of the civil court system.
While recognizing that the line between the secular and the religious
might be difficult to draw in this type of fact situation, the supreme court
ultimately concluded that the secular confidentiality interest advanced by
the plaintiff's cause of action was insufficient "to override the strong con-
stitutional presumption that favors preserving the church's interest in
managing its affairs." '13
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Texas Supreme Court reversed a default judgment based on substi-
tuted service in Hubicki v. Festina.14 The plaintiff unsuccessfully at-
tempted to serve the defendant by certified mail, as authorized by Rules
8. Id. at 840. Accord Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. E.E. Lowrey Realty, Ltd., 235
S.W.3d 692, 694-95 (Tex. 2007).
9. United Serv. Auto Ass'n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400, 401 (Tex. 2007).
10. Id. at 402.
11. Id. at 402-03.
12. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 389 (Tex. 2007).
13. Id. at 402.
14. Hubicki v. Festina, 226 S.W.3d 405, 405 (Tex. 2007).
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106(a)(2) 15 and 108a(1) 16 at an address in Mexico.17 The plaintiff then
moved for substituted service by first class mail to the same address. The
motion was supported by the process server's affidavit stating that the
defendant had failed or refused to claim the certified mailing, but that he
was currently in Mexico and could usually be found at that address. The
trial court ordered substituted service and when the defendant failed to
answer, entered a default judgment, which the Dallas Court of Appeals
affirmed. 18 The supreme court reversed, holding that the record failed to
demonstrate the alternative service was reasonably calculated to provide
the defendant with notice of the proceedings. 19 In doing so, the supreme
court relied on the fact that the plaintiff made only one unsuccessful at-
tempt to serve the defendant by certified mail and failed to provide any
evidence that the defendant was actually receiving mail at the address
provided. 20
Wachovia Bank of Delaware, N.A. v. Gilliam also emphasizes the im-
portance of strict compliance with the rules regarding substituted ser-
vice. 21 The plaintiff in this case alleged in his petition that the defendant
bank could be served at a Delaware address by either personal service or
service on the Texas Secretary of State. The constable's return showed
that service was in fact made on the Secretary of State. The file also
contained the Secretary's certificate that the process was forwarded to the
bank at the Delaware address specified by plaintiff and that a return re-
ceipt "'bearing the Signature of Addressee's Agent"' was received.22
When the bank did not answer, the trial judge entered a default judg-
ment, and the bank subsequently filed a restricted appeal. 23
Noting that it had never addressed the issue before, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted the prevailing rule in the intermediate appellate courts
that, on a restricted appeal, the record must indicate that service on the
Secretary of State was indeed forwarded to the statutorily-required ad-
dress.24 The Secretary's certificate was conclusive that the process was
forwarded to the address provided, but it did not certify that address was
the bank's "home office" as required by the Texas Long-Arm statute. 25
Because the record otherwise failed to show that the Secretary had for-
15. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2).
16. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
17. Festina, 226 S.W.3d at 406-07.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 408.
20. Id. The supreme court also noted that because service by first class mail was not
attempted until a month after the plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff's petition also alleged
that defendant had a Dallas residence, there was no evidence that the defendant was in
Mexico at the time the substituted service was attempted. Id.
21. Wachovia Bank of Del., N.A. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. 2007).
22. Id. at 849.
23. ld.
24. Id. at 850.
25. Id. See generally TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(a) (Vernon 2008)




warded the process to the proper address, the court found that the default
judgment could not stand.26
In Proulx v. Wells, the Texas Supreme Court held that there was a fact
question as to whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in ef-
fecting service, and, therefore, the trial court's summary judgment based
on the expiration of limitations was inappropriate. 27 The plaintiff filed
suit shortly before limitations ran but did not succeed in serving defen-
dant until more than eight months later. The trial court granted a sum-
mary judgment on limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Acknowledging that its "jurisprudence has at times been less than clear in
explaining the summary-judgment burden" 28 in these types of cases, the
supreme court reversed. The supreme court clarified that once the defen-
dant pleads limitations and shows that service was effected after the stat-
ute ran, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to explain the delay.29 If the
plaintiff's evidence and explanation are insufficient for some legal reason,
or if the evidence fails to raise a fact question as to reasonable diligence,
then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.30 If the plaintiff
succeeds in raising a fact question, however, the burden shifts back to the
defendant to demonstrate conclusively the lack of diligence. 31 In Wells,
the supreme court held that, while there were some short delays between
the plaintiff's many and varied efforts to serve defendant, the defendant
did conclusively establish a lack of diligence.
32
III. VENUE
In re Texas Department of Transportation addressed the proper venue
over a state agency in a personal injury case arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. 33 The accident occurred in Gillespie County, and the plaintiffs
sued the Texas Department of Transportation ("TxDOT") and Gillespie
County in Travis County. The plaintiffs claimed venue was proper be-
cause part of the cause of action, specifically TxDOT's alleged negligence
in designing, maintaining, and inspecting the roadway, arose in Travis
County where TxDOT maintained its offices. 34 Distinguishing claims for
negligent conduct from those for premises defects, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs pleaded only the latter, and therefore had
not alleged a negligence claim that would support venue over TxDOT in
Travis County.35
26. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d at 850-51.
27. Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 214 (Tex. 2007).
28. Id. at 215.




33. In re Tex. Dep't of Transp., 218 S.W.3d 74, 74 (Tex. 2007).
34. Id. at 76. The plaintiffs alleged venue was proper as to Gillespie County under
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.005 (Vernon 2002), because it was properly
joined as a defendant with TxDOT. Id.
35. Id. at 77-78.
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The Texas Supreme Court enforced the forum selection clause in an
employment contract in In re AutoNation, Inc.36 Although the contract
stipulated that all disputes be litigated in Florida under Florida law, the
employee sued in Texas, and the trial court both refused to dismiss the
action and enjoined the employer from pursuing its first-filed Florida law-
suit. On mandamus, the supreme court held this was error and that the
dispute should be heard in the Florida courts as the parties had expressly
agreed.37 The supreme court distinguished its prior decision in DeSantis
v. Wackenhut Corp.,38 which had held that Texas law would govern a
claim for breach of a covenant not to compete despite the contract's
choice-of-law provision specifying Florida law. The supreme court noted
that DeSantis involved only a choice-of-law question and not a forum se-
lection clause or prior pending litigation in the parties' chosen jurisdic-
tion.39 Moreover, the supreme court explained that principles of
interstate comity, while not requiring a Texas court to defer to a first-filed
action in another state, were particularly significant in circumstances such
as these.40
Section 15.062(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code pro-
vides that venue of the main action shall also establish venue over third-
party claims filed in that action.41 Moreover, if a third-party defendant is
properly joined, section 15.062(b) provides that venue is also proper over
the plaintiff's claims directly against the third-party defendant that arise
out of the same subject matter.42 This latter provision came into conflict
with section 15.015, 43 which provides for mandatory venue in a suit
against a county, in In re County of Galveston.44 In this scenario, the
Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that section 15.062(b)
prevails, and venue is proper in the county where the main suit is
pending.4 5
Killeen v. Lighthouse Electrical Contractors, L.P. involved a dispute be-
tween a Travis County homeowner and a Travis County contractor which
ended up in court in Bexar County. 46 The contractor claimed that,
through an exchange of letters with its San Antonio counsel, the home-
owner had agreed to a settlement of the dispute. The contractor filed suit
to enforce the settlement agreement in Bexar County, and the home-
owner moved to transfer venue to Travis County. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that there was some probative evidence to support
36. In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 663 (Tex. 2007).
37. Id. at 669.
38. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. 1990).
39. AutoNation, 228 S.W.3d at 669.
40. Id. at 670.
41. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.062(a) (Vernon 2002).
42. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.062(b) (Vernon 2002).
43. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.015 (Vernon 2002).
44. In re County of Galveston, 211 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, orig. proceeding).
45. Id. at 882-83.
46. Killeen v. Lighthouse Elec. Contractors, 248 S.W.3cd 343, 345 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
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a finding that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim oc-
curred in Bexar County through the homeowner's exchanges with the
contractor's attorney, and venue was therefore proper in Bexar County.
47
IV. PARTIES
In Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lubin, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed
the certification requirements for a class action suit brought by the Texas
attorney general on behalf of insurance buyers.48 The Texas Insurance
Code authorizes three types of class actions, one of which may be brought
by the attorney general.49 The issue in this case was whether the attorney
general must strictly comply with all requirements for class certification
and, therefore, name individual class members as representatives. The
trial court held strict compliance was not necessary and certified the class.
The court of appeals disagreed and reversed, finding that the attorney
general must strictly comply with the certification requirements. On ap-
peal to the Texas Supreme Court, the State argued that the attorney gen-
eral may file a class action under the doctrine of parens patriae (which
literally means "parent of the country") without meeting the normal cer-
tification requirements. The intervenors, on the other hand, claimed that
the attorney general must meet all of the certification requirements, even
though this would require recruiting policyholders (such as themselves)
as class representatives.
As an initial matter, the supreme court declined to adopt the parens
patriae doctrine, which would allow the attorney general to represent a
class without designating representative parties whose claims are typical
and who will adequately protect the interest of the class. The supreme
court found that the doctrine did not appear in the Texas Insurance
Code's class action provision, that the doctrine was not a type of class
action tool, rather an alternative to it, and that the supreme court had
previously invoked that doctrine solely with respect to persons unable to
protect themselves, such as children or those who were mentally ill.5
0
Although the supreme court held that the doctrine of parens patriae did
not exempt the attorney general from meeting the class certification re-
quirements, it refused to demand compliance with those requirements in
such a way that would in effect make attorney general class actions im-
possible. Accordingly, the supreme court held that the attorney general
47. Id. at 348-49 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a) (1) (Vernon
2002)).
48. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 417 (Tex. 2007).
49. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 541.251(a) (Vernon 2008). "Unlike any other state stat-
ute, the Insurance Code contains its own set of class action rules." Lubin, 222 S.W.3d at
422. However, they are almost identical to those currently in Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 42. Id. "Both include the same four prerequisites for all class actions (numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) and the same four types of main-
tainable class actions (those involving a risk of inconsistent adjudications, those that might
impair non-parties' interests, those seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, and those in
which common questions predominate)." Id.
50. Id. at 423-24.
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need not meet the certification requirements typically applied to a class
representative but would still be required to meet the remaining certifica-
tion requirements. 51
In In re State of Texas,52 the Houston First District Court of Appeals
held that a motion for new trial filed by a non-party does not extend the
trial court's plenary power under Rule 329b(c). 53 In this case, the motion
for new trial was filed by the arrestee's father, who had not intervened in
the suit. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court's order granting
his motion for new trial was signed outside of its plenary power. 54
V. PLEADINGS
In Low v. Henry,55 the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of
sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
("Chapter 10").56 In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff filed suit
against the alleged manufacturers, designers, and distributors of a drug
known as Propulsid, as well as two physicians who allegedly prescribed
that drug. Shortly after the case was filed, the physicians filed a motion
for sanctions against the plaintiff and her counsel for alleged violations of
Chapter 10. The physicians claimed that, at the time the suit was filed,
the plaintiff's counsel possessed medical records that proved the physi-
cians had not prescribed or administered the drug at issue. The trial court
granted the physicians' motion and ordered the plaintiff's counsel to pay
sanctions in the amount of $50,000. The plaintiff's counsel appealed, and
the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's pleadings were not sanction-
able under Chapter 10 because the claims against the physicians had been
asserted in the alternative. The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 57
51. Id. at 426.
52. In re State, 221 S.W.3d 713, 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
53. TEX. R. CIv. P. 329b(c).
54. State, 221 S.W.3d at 714.
55. 221 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2007).
56. Chapter 10 provides that:
The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory's
best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper pur-
pose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation;
(2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading or mo-
tion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law;
(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion
has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual
contention, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention is war-
ranted on the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.
TEX. Civ. PR c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001 (Vernon 2002).
57. State, 221 S.W.3d at 612.
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First, the supreme court noted that under Chapter 10, the signer of a
pleading certifies that each claim and allegation is based on the signa-
tory's best knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry.58 The statute dictates that each claim and allegation be
individually evaluated for support. Thus, the fact that an allegation or
claim is alleged against several defendants-so called "group pleading"-
does not relieve the party from meeting the express requirements of
Chapter 10. Rather, each claim against each defendant must satisfy
Chapter 10.59
Second, the supreme court found that alternative pleading under Rule
4860 does not excuse compliance with Chapter 10.61 Although pleading in
the alternative allows multiple-and possibly conflicting-allegations to
be alleged against a defendant, there still must be a reasonable basis for
each alternative allegation. Each alternative allegation and factual con-
tention in a pleading must have or be likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable inquiry. Applying this standard, the supreme court
held that plaintiff's counsel had violated Chapter 10 because, prior to fil-
ing suit, he was in possession of medical records that indicated neither
physician had prescribed or administered Propulsid to the plaintiff.
62
Finally, the supreme court reviewed the amount of sanctions awarded
by the trial court under Chapter 10. The supreme court first reiterated
the general maxim that a sanction cannot be excessive and should not be
assessed without appropriate guidelines.63 Although the supreme court
acknowledged that it had never specifically identified factors for a trial
court to consider when assessing penalties under Chapter 10, it held that
the absence of any explanation by the trial court for such severe sanctions
amounted to reversible error. The supreme court found that the trial
court should have considered at least some of the factors set forth by the
American Bar Association in its 1988 report regarding sanctions under
federal Rule 11.64 Accordingly, the supreme court held that although the
58. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001 (Vernon 2002).
59. Low, 221 S.W.3d at 615.
60. TEX. R. Civ. P. 48.
61. Low, 221 S.W.3d at 615.
62. Id. at 616-17.
63. Id. at 620 (citing TransAmerican Nat'l Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917
(Tex. 1991)).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The ABA's 1988 report was designed, in part, to help bring
uniformity to the uneven application of sanctions under Rule 11. American Bar Associa-
tion, Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, reprinted in 121 F.R.D. 101, 104 (1988). The non-exclusive list of factors
include:
a. the good faith or bad faith of the offender;
b. the degree of willfulness, vindictiveness, negligence, or frivolousness in-
volved in the offense;
c. the knowledge, experience, and expertise of the offender;
d. any prior history of sanctionable conduct on the part of the offender;
e. the reasonableness and necessity of the out-of-pocket expenses incurred
by the offended person as a result of the misconduct;
f. the nature and extent of prejudice, apart from out-of-pocket expenses,
suffered by the offended person as a result of the misconduct;
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trial court was within its discretion to award sanctions under Chapter 10,
it could not determine the basis of the $50,000 penalty from the record,
and it remanded the amount of the sanctions back to the trial court for
further review.6
5
In Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether statements from a superseded pleading were
admissible at trial.66 In this medical malpractice case, the trial court ad-
mitted evidence that the plaintiffs had originally sued two physicians in-
volved in the incident but had non-suited the physicians before trial. The
supreme court first noted that "statements from pleadings, depending on
their content, could potentially be excluded as irrelevant or unfairly prej-
udicial. ' '67 Here, however, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs were
estopped from making this complaint "because their attorney was the
first to allude to the doctors' party status by telling the jury panel that
[the doctors'] conduct 'could have been brought before this [court],' but
'both sides have not done that at this trial."
68
Next, the supreme court held that the court of appeals had erred by
holding that "statements from [superseded] pleadings would only be ad-
missible if they contained 'some statement relevant to a material issue in
the case' that is 'inconsistent with [the] position taken by [the] party
against whom it is introduced.' 69 The supreme court noted that before
the Texas Rules of Evidence were promulgated, Texas case law required
an inconsistency between the superseded pleading and the party's posi-
tion at trial. However, the supreme court went on to explain that the
Texas Rules of Evidence no longer required inconsistency when it comes
to admissibility of superseded pleadings.70 Thus, the supreme court held
that there was no requirement that the statement from the superseded
pleading be inconsistent with the party's position at trial, and therefore,
g. the relative culpability of client and counsel, and the impact on their
privileged relationship of an inquiry into that area;
h. the risk of chilling the specific type of litigation involved;
i. the impact of the sanction on the offender, including the offender's ability
to pay a monetary sanction;
j. the impact of the sanction on the offended party, including the offended
person's need for compensation;
k. the relative magnitude of sanction necessary to achieve the goal or goals
of the sanction;
1. burdens on the court system attributable to the misconduct, including
consumption of judicial time and incurrence of juror fees and other court
costs;
n. the degree to which the offended person's own behavior caused the ex-
penses for which recovery is sought ....
Id. at 125-26 (cited in Powell, 811 S.W.2d at 920-21).
65. Low, 221 S.W.3d at 621-22.
66. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. 2007).
67. Id. at 234.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 235.
70. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2) (admissions by a party opponent are admissible).
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the trial court had not erred in allowing that evidence. 71
In Simmons v. McKinney, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reviewed the
propriety of granting a default judgment after the party obtaining a de-
fault had received notice by facsimile that the opposing party was filing
an answer and counterclaim.72 In this construction case, the homeowners
sued their contractor for breach of contract. Although the defendant did
not timely file an answer, approximately three weeks after its answer
date, at 10:30 p.m., defendant's counsel faxed a general denial and coun-
terclaim to plaintiffs' counsel. The next morning, plaintiffs appeared
before the trial court, proved up their damages, and were granted a de-
fault judgment. Later that day, the defendant filed his answer and coun-
terclaim. The defendant did not receive notice of the default judgment
until approximately one month later and filed a motion for new trial,
which the trial court denied. The defendant then appealed.
Relying on Rule 21a,73 the defendant argued that since he had faxed
the answer and counterclaim to plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiffs could not
subsequently obtain a default. The court of appeals rejected the defen-
dant's argument, noting that "to answer a lawsuit, a defendant must make
an appearance in the suit or file an answer [in the trial court] seeking a
judgment or decision by the court on some question. '74 An appearance
ordinarily means the process of submission of a person to the jurisdiction
of the court. The court held that simply faxing an answer to opposing
counsel after hours was not the same as filing an answer with the court
via the "mail box" rule.75
The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he was entitled to
notice of the default judgment hearing. Rather, the court held that par-
ties are only entitled to notice after they have appeared in the lawsuit.
Since no such appearance had occurred, defendant and his counsel were
not entitled to notice.76
Finally, the court held that the defendant's motion for new trial was
properly denied because defendant's counsel had only generally claimed
that his failure to timely file an answer was due to accident or mistake
with no evidence on the record supporting that allegation.77
VI. DISCOVERY
The Texas Supreme Court issued a number of decisions on discovery
issues during the Survey period. In In re Christus Spohn Hospital Kle-
berg,78 the supreme court was presented with a conflict between Rule
71. McShane, 239 S.W.3d at 235.
72. Simmons v. McKinney, 225 S.W.3d 706, 706 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.).
73. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
74. Simmons, 225 S.W.3d at 708.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 709.
77. Id.
78. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 435 (Tex. 2007).
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192.3(e)(6), 79 which makes all materials provided to a testifying expert
discoverable, and Rule 193.3(d), 80 which mandates the return of privi-
leged documents that have been inadvertently produced. The hospital in
this case mistakenly provided a privileged memorandum to its expert,
who acknowledged having "glanced" at all the documents provided to
her. The supreme court began by noting that under the current discovery
rules, it was irrelevant whether the expert actually read the privileged
memorandum; because it was provided to her, it was discoverable. 81 The
supreme court went on to hold that, in this scenario, the disclosure rule
prevails over the so-called snap-back provision as long as the expert in-
tends to testify at trial.82
In re Bexar County Criminal District Attorney's Office involved a dis-
trict attorney's work-product privilege in the context of a subsequent civil
action. 83 After the district attorney's office had investigated and dropped
charges against David Crudup ("Crudup"), the real party in interest, he
sued the complaining parties for malicious prosecution. Pursuant to a
subpoena, the district attorney's office turned over its entire prosecution
file to Crudup, but it refused to comply with subpoenas for the deposi-
tions of its prosecutors and investigator. The Texas Supreme Court held
that the district attorney's office had a work-product privilege to refuse to
give testimony in the malicious prosecution case.84 Moreover, the su-
preme court held that the district attorney had not waived this privilege
by turning over its prosecution file without objection.85
The Texas Supreme Court enforced the parties' agreed protective order
in In re Ford Motor Co.86 Ford produced documents designated as confi-
dential in this case, as well as in a similar case in Florida. The clerk of the
Florida court mistakenly allowed access to the confidential documents,
portions of which were then submitted to a governmental agency, which
then posted the documents on its website for some period of time. The
Texas trial court granted a motion to designate the documents as non-
confidential, notwithstanding the agreed confidentiality order, because
they had been made publicly available on the Internet. The supreme
court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that "[n]o matter
how many people eventually saw the materials, disclosures by a third-
party, whether mistaken or malevolent, do not waive the privileged na-
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)(6).
80. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).
81. In re Christus Spohn Hospital Kleburg, 222 S.W.3d at 438 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P.
192.3(e)(6)).
82. Id. at 440. The court also noted that, if a party is required to obtain leave of court
to designate a new expert in order to preserve its privilege, the trial court "should carefully
weigh the alternatives available to prevent what may be akin to death-penalty sanctions for
the party forced to trial without a necessary expert." Id. at 445.
83. In re Bexar County Criminal Dist. Attorney's Office, 224 S.W.3d 182, 182 (Tex.
2007).
84. Id. at 187.
85. Id. at 189.
86. In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 295 (Tex. 2006).
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ture of the information. '87
The Texas Supreme Court continued to intervene during the Survey
period when it perceived the discovery process as being manipulated in
an abusive manner. In In re Allied Chemical Corp., a mass tort case, the
court granted mandamus relief to prevent a trial court from setting the
claims of one of 1,900 plaintiffs for trial, where none of the plaintiffs had
ever provided basic discovery regarding which products manufactured by
which of the thirty defendants were allegedly responsible for which plain-
tiffs' injuries.88 In In re Allstate County Mutual Insurance Co., a suit to
enforce a $13,500 settlement agreement, the supreme court held that the
trial court erred in compelling the defendant to respond to 213 discovery
requests seeking "everything the plaintiffs could imagine asking in any
unfair insurance practice case."'89
Texas courts continued to struggle with whether to allow pre-suit depo-
sitions of health care providers under Rule 202.90 In re Kiberu91 noted
that the courts of appeals are split on whether the health care liability
statute, which requires a plaintiff to provide a preliminary expert report
before he can take the oral deposition of another party, 92 trumps the
Rule 202 pre-suit deposition procedure. 93 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals sided with those cases that have allowed the Rule 202 deposition, at
least where such deposition is intended to investigate whether or not a
party even has a health care liability claim to assert. 94 Conversely, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals allowed a pre-suit deposition of a doctor
only to the extent necessary to investigate potential claims against a pros-
thetic manufacturer but not to address whether the doctor himself was
negligent, in In re Temple.95 Finally, In re Emergency Consultants, Inc.
involved a doctor's request for a pre-suit deposition, which the relators
resisted on the ground that the doctor had no private right of action
under a certain statute.96 The court rejected the relators' argument, hold-
ing that "Rule 202 does not require that a potential litigant expressly
state a viable claim before being permitted to take a pre-suit
deposition.197
In re General Agents Insurance Co. of America98 and In re Madrid99
87. Id. at 301.
88. In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 656-58 (Tex. 2007).
89. In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. 2007).
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202. However, following the Survey period, the Texas Supreme
Court resolved the appellate court conflict in In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008).
91. 237 S.W.3d 445, 449-50 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, orig. proceeding [mand.
pending]).
92. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 74.351(a), (s) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
93. Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d at 449 (citing cases).
94. Id. at 449-50.
95. 239 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding).
96. In re Emergency Consultants, Inc., No. 14-07-00002-CV, 2007 WL 64217, at *1, 2
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2007, orig. proceeding).
97. Id. at *1.
98. 224 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding).
99. 242 S.W.3d 563, 568-69 (Tex. App.-E Paso 2007, orig. proceeding).
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should be of interest to the liability insurance bar. In the former case,
after suffering an adverse judgment, the insured party assigned its claim
and its attorney-client privilege to the judgment creditor. In the judg-
ment creditor's subsequent suit against the insurer, the court held that the
insurer could not assert the attorney-client privilege to protect its com-
munications with the insurer-retained counsel for the insured in the un-
derlying suit. 100 In Madrid, the court held that an insurance company's
reservation of rights letter, prepared after suit was filed and sent to the
insured and his counsel, was both irrelevant to the plaintiff's negligence
claim against the insured and protected by the work-product privilege.'01
Finally, Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Chesnutt addressed a trial court's
power to invoke "death penalty" sanctions even after the plaintiff has
nonsuited the case. 10 2 Plaintiff, a lawyer herself, actively monitored her
lawsuit and hired and fired three sets of lawyers over approximately two
years while the case was pending. Nevertheless, she did not answer the
defendant's written discovery requests, and as a result, the defendant
filed a motion to compel and for sanctions. As one of the alternative
sanctions requested, the defendant asked the trial court to preclude plain-
tiff from presenting any evidence of the factual basis for her claims, or the
amount and method of calculation of damages, on the ground that this
information should have been provided in the unanswered discovery.
Before the defendant's motion was heard, however, plaintiff nonsuited
the case. Noting that a Rule 162103 dismissal does not affect a defen-
dant's right to be heard on a pending motion for sanctions, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held the trial court was authorized to proceed on the
motion for sanctions despite the nonsuit.10 4 Moreover, the court affirmed
the trial court's imposition of the sanction of dismissal with prejudice,
even though it had not been expressly requested because the evidence
preclusion sanction the defendant had requested would have been case
determinative as well. 105
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court in Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Co. held
that a summary judgment order that included a lump-sum dollar amount
for the plaintiff was final, even though the trial court did not segregate
the damages between attorneys' fees and expert witness expenses. 10 6 The
court reasoned that trial courts have never been required to itemize each
element of damages pleaded or specify in their rulings each element of
100. Gen. Agents Ins., 224 S.W.3d at 813-15.
101. Madrid, 242 S.W.3d at 569.
102. Johnson ex. rel Johnson v. Chestnutt, 225 S.W.3d 737, 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2007, pet. denied).
103. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
104. Johnson, 225 S.W.3d at 742.
105. Id. at 742, 744.
106. Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007).
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duty, breach, or causation for a summary judgment order to be final and
appealable.
The Houston First District Court of Appeals in Fabio v. Ertel reversed
and remanded a take-nothing judgment entered against a law firm in a
fee dispute where the trial court had first granted a partial summary judg-
ment for the law firm.10 7 The trial court advised the parties that it was
not reconsidering that decision, and consequently, the law firm did not
present evidence at trial regarding the subject matter of the partial sum-
mary judgment ruling. Thereafter, following a bench trial, the court en-
tered findings of fact and conclusions of law that conflicted with the
original summary judgment ruling. The court of appeals held that since
the trial court had previously advised the parties that it was not revisiting
its summary judgment ruling, the law firm had been deprived of proper
notice of the trial court's intent to reconsider its ruling and hence, did not
have the opportunity to present any evidence on those issues at trial. 10 8
In Dallas County v. Rischon Development Corp., the Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed a summary judgment decision against Dallas County
where the trial court held that the county's summary judgment response
was untimely.10 9 The parties had entered into a Rule 11110 agreement
that established certain deadlines for summary judgment materials to be
filed, but the county filed its response the day after the agree deadline
which was still more than seven days before the ultimate summary judg-
ment hearing.
Finally, the Tyler Court of Appeals in Pierce v. Washington Mutual
Bank reversed and remanded a summary judgment in favor of a bank
where, after answering sworn interrogatories about the location of his
homestead, the plaintiff then tendered an affidavit in response to a sum-
mary judgment motion that contradicted those interrogatory answers.11 '
The appellate court held that since conflicting inferences could be drawn
from a deposition and an affidavit filed by the nonmovant, a fact issue
remained, thereby precluding summary judgment. 112 The court rejected
the bank's argument that the plaintiff's subsequent affidavit should be
ignored as a "sham affidavit," concluding instead that "these inconsisten-
cies and conflicts create a fact issue that should be resolved by a jury.' ' 1 3
107. Fabio v. Entel, 226 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
108. Id. at 561-62.
109. Dallas County v. Rischon Dev. Corp., 242 S.W. 3d. 90, 90 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007,
pet. denied).
110. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
111. Pierce v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711, 717, 718 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet.
denied).
112. Id. at 716 (quoting Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex.
1988)).




In Cappetta v. Hermes, an en banc San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that the standards for motions to reinstate provided in Rule 165a(3) apply
regardless of whether a case is dismissed under Rule 165a(1) or (2), or
pursuant to the trial court's inherent power.114 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court first reasoned that the plain language of Rule 165a(3) did
not suggest applying differing standards for a statutory dismissal than for
a dismissal under the court's inherent authority. Second, the court noted
that the intent behind the amendments to Rule 165a1 15 was for the stan-
dard to be the same for both types of dismissals. Finally, the court con-
cluded that no valid purpose would be served by creating different
standards for the two types of dismissals.
Two appellate court decisions during the Survey period held that in the
absence of a signed order of reinstatement, a dismissal for want of prose-
cution is final even if the parties and the court subsequently treat the
litigation as active. In Wallingford v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., the
trial court granted a motion to reinstate a case that had been dismissed
for want of prosecution, and noted the reinstatement determination on
the printed docket sheet.11 6 However, the court never signed an order of
reinstatement. For the next year, the parties and the trial court treated
the case as if it had been reinstated, with the trial court granting a motion
for continuance and entering an amended scheduling order. Over a year
after the trial court had orally pronounced its reinstatement decision, the
plaintiff's counsel submitted a proposed written order of reinstatement,
prompting the defendant to move to dismiss based on lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the case. The Amarillo
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither the trial court's oral pro-
nouncement of reinstatement, its docket sheet entry, nor the parties' sub-
sequent conduct was sufficient to overcome the absence of a written
order reinstating the case. 117
Similarly, in Davis v. Smith, the trial court dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction when the plaintiff failed to appear at a scheduled status
conference despite receiving a letter from her attorney reminding her to
attend.1 18 The plaintiff moved to reinstate the case, which the trial court
took under advisement but did not rule upon. Thereafter, the plaintiff
appeared for her deposition and moved for mediation. The trial denied
the motion to mediate because the case had been dismissed. The First
District Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal and denied the bill of re-
view because the plaintiff had failed to obtain a written order regarding
114. Capetta v. Hermes, 222 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
115. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
116. Wallingford v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 253 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2007, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 726.




her motion to reinstate. 119 The appellate court also rejected the argu-
ment that the trial court was required to notify the plaintiff of its decision
regarding the motion to reinstate, noting that nothing in either Rules
165a120 or 306a121 requires the trial court to give notice to the parties
when, by its inaction, a motion to reinstate is deemed overruled by opera-
tion of law.
In Salas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the El Paso
Court of Appeals construed the effect of dismissal pleadings that in-
cluded more parties than the plaintiff intended. 122 In this automobile col-
lision case, the plaintiff settled with one defendant but then signed a
motion to dismiss that erroneously indicated that the dismissal applied to
all parties. The trial court signed an order dismissing all of the plaintiff's
claims against all defendants. Because the plaintiff failed to file her no-
tice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the dismissal order, the
court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.123 In so
holding, the appellate court noted that, while the plaintiff may not have
intended to dismiss her claims against all parties, the dismissal order
clearly indicated that the trial court's intent was to dismiss all claims of all
parties, making the order final and appealable. 124
In Fox v. Hinderliter,1 25 the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed
the interplay between Rule 162's126 right to non-suit and a motion to dis-
miss and for sanctions challenging the adequacy of a plaintiff's expert re-
port in a medical malpractice action. After the plaintiffs filed suit and
submitted their expert report, one of the defendants moved to dismiss the
claims against him with prejudice and requested attorneys' fees and costs
based on defects in the expert report. The day before that hearing was
set, the plaintiffs filed their notice of nonsuit without prejudice, and the
trial court therefore refused to hear the defendant's motion. Approxi-
mately one year later, the plaintiffs amended their pleadings and rejoined
that defendant but with a different expert report from a new doctor. The
defendant then filed an amended motion to dismiss, challenging deficien-
cies in the new report and reurging his request for a dismissal and sanc-
tions based on the original report, which the trial court denied. On
appeal, the court of appeals held that although the non-suit was effective
immediately, it did not prejudice the defendant's then-pending motion to
dismiss and for sanctions.12 7 After determining that the original expert
report was defective, the appellate court held that the trial court could
119. Id. at 304.
120. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
122. Salas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 226 S.W.3d 692, 695, (mand. denied, In re
Salas, 228 S.W.3d 774, 775 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id.
125. 222 S.W.3d 154, 155 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. struck).
126. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
127. Fox, 222 S.W.3d at 158.
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have ruled upon that motion despite the non-suit. 12 8 The appellate court
therefore concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
dismiss the suit based upon defects in the original report.
129
Similarly, in Crites v. Collins the plaintiffs filed their medical malprac-
tice suit against the doctor but failed to file their expert report within the
mandated 120-day period.130 After the deadline to file their expert re-
port expired, the plaintiffs filed their notice of nonsuit. The defendant
then moved for a dismissal with prejudice and to recover attorneys' fees
and costs, which the trial court denied. The appellate court affirmed,
holding that when the plaintiffs filed their nonsuit pleadings, no such mo-
tion was pending.' 31 Had the defendant's motion to dismiss and for sanc-
tions been pending before the plaintiffs filed their nonsuit, the trial court
would have been required to rule on it. However, because the nonsuit
was effective immediately, and the defendant's motion was not on file at
the time, the defendant had effectively waived his right to seek that
relief.' 32
IX. JURY PRACTICE
In In re Hearst Newspapers Partnership, L.P., the Houston First District
Court of Appeals held that a trial court's gag order, entered following a
pre-verdict settlement, was unconstitutional where it prohibited jurors
from speaking to the press, media, or others about the evidence and what
their votes would have been if the case had proceeded to verdict. 133 The
dispute arose out of a refinery explosion at British Petroleum's plant in
Texas City in March 2005, and the trial court had anticipated that there
would be many other suits arising out of the same event. The appellate
court weighed the competing interests between the rights of free speech
and press versus the need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations, a
juror's right to privacy and to be free from harassment, and a defendant's
right to a fair trial. The court held that the lower court erred in failing to
use the least restrictive means possible to obtain its objective of not taint-
ing future jury pools about the same incident. 3 4 Specifically, protecting
the secrecy of jury deliberations was not a concern since the case settled.
In addition, there were no concerns about a criminal defendant's right to
a fair trial. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's concern
about selecting future jurors in related cases was insufficient to outweigh
the competing rights to free speech, especially since that issue could be
remedied through voir dire.'
35
128. Id. at 160.
129. Id.
130. Crites v. Collins, 215 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
131. Id. at 926.
132. Id.
133. In re Hearst Newspapers P'ship, L.P., 241 S.W.3d 190, 198 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding).




The same court of appeals addressed the issue of improper jury argu-
ment in Jones v. Republic Waste Services of Texas, Ltd.136 In this breach
of contract and fraud case, one of the appellees' attorneys suggested dur-
ing her closing remarks that the opposing counsel had suborned perjury.
The attorney further attacked the integrity of opposing counsel by,
among other things, suggesting that the appellant's theory of the case was
simply an after-the-fact construct manufactured by the attorneys in meet-
ings, although there was no evidence of any such meetings. The appel-
lants argued that these statements constituted incurable and reversible
error. The appellate court, while severely admonishing the appellees'
counsel for her conduct both at trial and in her appellees' brief, ultimately
disagreed, holding that improper argument is not per se incurable and
must be evaluated on the facts and circumstances of the case. 137 Here,
the court concluded that attorneys' remarks, while "reprehensible," were
curable and not preserved by a timely objection. 138 The court noted that
the comments at issue were short in duration, not repeated, and occurred
at the end of a nearly three-week long trial, which included evidence that
was contrary to the statements made during closing argument.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in Mikey's Houses, LLC v.
Bank of America, N.A. that a contractual waiver of trial by jury provision
was unenforceable because there was insufficient evidence that the
waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made with full awareness of the
legal consequences. 139 The contractual waiver stated: "Waiver of Trial by
Jury. Seller and Buyer knowingly and conclusively waive all rights to trial
by jury in any action or proceeding relating to this Contract."1 4 0 Not-
withstanding this plain language, the court held that it was incumbent
upon the bank to prove that the waiver was enforceable, rather than re-
quiring the party challenging it to prove it was unenforceable. 14 1 Next,
the court examined seven factors in determining whether the waiver pro-
vision was enforceable including the parties' experience in negotiating the
type of contract involved, whether the parties were represented by coun-
sel, whether the parties had an opportunity to examine the agreement,
the overall negotiations between the parties, the conspicuousness of the
provision, and the relative bargaining position of the parties. The court
focused heavily on the conspicuousness of the provision and the lack of
any discussions between the parties about it. Although the title of the
provision as it appeared in the record was underlined, and notwithstand-
ing the fact that the appellant admitted she could have read it if she had
chosen to, could have retained counsel, and was not rushed into signing it,
136. 236 S.W.3d 390, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
137. Id. at 403.
138. Id.
139. Mikey's Houses, LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 232 S.W.3d 145, 157 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.).
140. Id. at 148.
141. Id. at 152-53.
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the court concluded that the bank had not proved the provision was
enforceable.
The court in Sharpless v. Sim held that although a juror violated the
court's instructions against conducting an independent investigation of an
automobile collision outside of trial, the judgment for the plaintiff should
still be affirmed because the information obtained by the juror was not
material. 142 The juror found the driving record of the driver on the In-
ternet, but did not uncover his prior drug conviction, which had been
excluded from evidence. Moreover, because the verdict was 10-2 and the
juror who conducted the independent investigation was one of the two
dissenting jurors, no harm resulted.
Finally, in Smith v. Dean, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed
the topic of rehabilitating venire members during voir dire when several
jurors raised their hand in response to a question to indicate agreement
with a potentially disqualifying statement made by another panel mem-
ber.14 3 The court held that such conduct did not show unequivocal bias as
a matter of law and as a result, those jurors could have been rehabilitated
through subsequent questioning. 144 The appellate court concluded that
the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the conduct and intent
of the panel members and ultimately to determine if they had been
rehabilitated.
X. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court in Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista ad-
dressed whether submission of an inferential rebuttal instruction on una-
voidable accident resulted in reversible error, warranting a new trial.
1 45
This suit emanated from an accident at the defendant's retail store where
a plastic trash can fell from a twelve foot shelf. At trial, the jury received
a broad form liability submission and, over the plaintiff's objection, an
unavoidable accident instruction. The jury found no liability, and the trial
court entered a take-nothing judgment in defendant's favor. The su-
preme court found no reversible error in the jury charge. 146 In so hold-
ing, the court distinguished this case from the situation in Crown Life
Insurance Co. v. Casteel, which involved the use of a single, broad-form
question that incorporated both valid and invalid theories of liability
thereby creating a presumption of reversible error.1 47 The court declined
to extend the holding of Casteel to this case, which involved only the in-
clusion of an unsupported inferential rebuttal instruction.
The Texas Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Equistar Chemi-
cals, L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co. relating to the "economic loss rule. '1 48 In
142. Sharpless v. Sim, 209 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
143. Smith v. Dean, 232 S.W. 3d 181, 192 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
144. Id. at 759.
145. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 754 (Tex. 2006).
146. Id. at 759.
147. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tex. 2000).
148. Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Tex. 2007).
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this commercial dispute, the plaintiff submitted both tort and contract
theories of liability, but the jury only received a single damage question
for all liability theories. The supreme court held that the economic loss
rule was a part of the plaintiff's cause of action and not an affirmative
defense that needed to be pleaded.149 Moreover, the court held that if
the defendant contended that a single damage question was error, it
should have objected to that question to preserve error for appeal.1 5 0 Be-
cause it did not, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the
court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. 15 1
In Schrock v. Sisco, which involved claims of assault and intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the Eastland
Court of Appeals faced a similar situation where the jury received, over
the objection of defendant's counsel, liability issues on both assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 152 The jury found for the
plaintiff on both liability theories and awarded her compensatory dam-
ages of $40,000 on her intentional infliction claim, $25,000 on her assault
claim, and $50,000 in exemplary damages. During the post-verdict pro-
ceedings, the plaintiff offered to remit the damages for her intentional
infliction claim, which the trial court accepted; however, the punitive
damage award remained intact. On appeal, the defendant complained
that the submission of both liability theories was still error and was not
cured by the remittitur because of the unchanged exemplary damage
award. The appellate court agreed. 153 The court first concluded that the
defendant had preserved its objection to the exemplary damage question
because it had objected to the underlying liability theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to which the exemplary damage award was
tied.154 The court then concluded that the jury could have been improp-
erly influenced by the inclusion of the intentional infliction liability ques-
tion in its deliberations, based on which it then may have then improperly
awarded exemplary damages. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. 1 55
XI. JUDGMENTS
In Titan Indemnity Co. v. Old South Insurance Group, Inc., the San
Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the situation where default judg-
ments were entered against a party after its general counsel failed to open
two of three emails sent to him containing three separate suits because he
assumed that he had been sent three copies of the same suit based on
149. Id. at 868.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 868-69.
152. Schrock v. Sisco, 229 S.W.3d 392, 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.).
153. Id. at 394.
154. Id. at 395.
155. Id. at 396.
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prior litigation in another state involving the same parties.156 The appel-
late court held that appellant's failure to answer two of the suits was neg-
ligent, but not the result of conscious indifference. 157 In reaching this
conclusion, the court of appeals considered the evidence presented at the
motions for new trial, including expert testimony, but still found that
there was no evidence contradicting the testimony of the general counsel
that he had not opened all three emails when they came in, and thus
concluded that the general counsel's testimony about his conduct and de-
cisions was unrefuted.
In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Laca, the El Paso Court of
Appeals dealt with the unusual situation where after a bench trial, the
trial judge was asked but failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law.' 58 The original judge was then replaced following an election.
Since entering findings of fact and conclusions of law was required under
Rule 297,159 the appellate court determined that reversal was required.
Because the original trial judge had been replaced, however, the court of
appeals could not remand the case to him for entry of findings and con-
clusions but instead had no choice but to order a new trial.
160
XII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Phillips v. Phillips addressed an unusual interplay between a motion to
show authority under Rule 12161 filed by a party's original attorney and a
motion for new trial filed by her new attorney.162 After the parties signed
a divorce decree in this case, the appellant asked her original attorney to
file a motion for new trial or notice of appeal. He refused. The appellant
then engaged new counsel who did file a motion for new trial prior to
filing a motion to substitute counsel. The prior attorney then filed a mo-
tion to show authority under Rule 12,163 claiming he was still counsel of
record. The trial court granted the Rule 12164 motion and struck the mo-
tion for new trial. The First District Court of Appeals held that because a
Rule 12165 motion must be brought by a party, and the original attorney
did not meet that definition, his motion to show authority was void.
166
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in striking the motion for new trial.
156. Tital Indem. Co. v. Old South Ins. Group, Inc., 221 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. App. -
San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
157. Id. at 711.
158. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Laca, 243 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007,
no pet.).
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297.
160. Liberty Mut., 243 S.W.3d at 796.
161. TEX. R. Civ. P. 12.
162. Phillips v. Phillips, 244 S.W.3d 433, 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
163. TEX. R. Civ. P. 12.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Phillips, 244 S.W.3d at 435.
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XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Seger was an appeal from a Stowers ac-
tion.167 The insurers claimed the underlying judgment was not the result
of a fully adversarial trial, inasmuch as the insured defendant was not
represented by counsel at trial and presented no evidence or argument.
The insurers argued that the trial judge should be recused as a material
witness because he also presided over the underlying liability case.168
The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected this contention, noting that the
complete transcript of the underlying proceeding was admitted as evi-
dence in the Stowers case and that the insurers "fail[ed] to identify any
specific knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts" held by the judge. 169
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Basco arose out of doctor's suit against a hospital for wrongful
termination of his privileges. 170 The doctor sought to disqualify the hos-
pital's attorney on the ground that the attorney would have to question
the work product of his former law partner, who had advised the doctor
in a previous medical malpractice case. The hospital had cited the doc-
tor's failure to report the earlier suit against him as one of the grounds for
termination of his privileges, but the doctor claimed his attorney had ad-
vised him the suit was unmeritorious and that he should not report it until
it was resolved.'71 Under these circumstances, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the hospital's attorney could not adequately defend the termi-
nation case without challenging his former law partner's advice in the
malpractice case, and disqualification was therefore mandatory. 172
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
In In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., the Texas Supreme Court, in a matter
of first impression, ruled that the doctrine of "substantially interdepen-
dent and concerted misconduct" did not permit third parties to invoke an
arbitration clause. 173 In this case, the plaintiffs engaged Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. ("Merrill Lynch") to provide certain finan-
cial services. The plaintiffs' contract with Merrill Lynch contained an ar-
bitration clause. In connection with providing those services, Merrill
167. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Seger, No. 07-05-00188-CV, 2007 WL 1771614, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo Aug. 9, 2007, pet. filed) (citing G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem.
Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved)).
168. Id. at *14.
169. Id. at *14-15. The court of appeals also upheld the trial court's denial of the insur-
ers' motion to disqualify their opposing counsel, who were also counsel for plaintiffs in the
underlying case. Id. at *15-16. The court assumed without deciding that the attorneys
were in fact material witnesses, but held the insurers failed to show how they were harmed.
Id. at *15.
170. In re Basco, 221 S.W.3d 637, 638 (Tex. 2007).
171. Id. at 638.
172. Id. at 639.
173. In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. 2007).
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Lynch recommended that the plaintiffs set up an irrevocable life insur-
ance trust with Merrill Lynch Trust Company ("ML Trust") as trustee,
which then purchased a life insurance policy from Merrill Lynch Life In-
surance Company ("ML Life"). Both of these Merrill Lynch affiliates
had their own independent contracts with the plaintiffs, neither of which
contained an arbitration provision.
The plaintiffs subsequently sued ML Trust, ML Life, and a single Mer-
rill Lynch employee, asserting claims based on their alleged mismanage-
ment and misconduct. ML Trust and ML Life moved to stay the litigation
pursuant to the arbitration clause in plaintiffs' contract with Merrill
Lynch. ML Life and ML Trust argued that they could invoke Merrill
Lynch's arbitration provision through an estoppel theory because plain-
tiffs' claims were based on "substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct" between them and Merrill Lynch, which had not been
sued. 174 The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held
that plaintiffs' claims against ML Life and ML Trust could not be com-
pelled to arbitration.175
First, the court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act did not compel
or require arbitration merely because two claims arose from the same
transaction or occurrence. 176 The court did recognize that, in some cir-
cumstances, other courts have compelled arbitration when a non-signa-
tory defendant had a "close relationship" with one of the signatories and
the claims were intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. 177
However, the court further noted that the "close relationship" require-
ment had generally been limited to instances where a signatory, instead
of "suing the other party for breach," sues the "party's non signatory
principals or agents" for the alleged misconduct. 178 Here, the court
found the "concerted misconduct" test had no "close relationship" re-
quirement and therefore, could improperly "sweep independent entities
and even complete strangers into arbitration agreements.' '1 79
Second, the court held that the "concerted misconduct" theory could
not be used to compel arbitration as a matter of contract law:
[W]hile Texas law has long recognized that nonparties may be bound
to a contract under traditional contract rules like agency or alter-ego,
there has never been such a rule for concerted misconduct. Conspir-
acy is a tort, not a rule of contract law. And while conspirators con-
sent to accomplish an unlawful act, that does not mean they
impliedly consent to each other's arbitration agreements. As other
contracts do not become binding on nonparties due to concerted
misconduct, allowing arbitration contracts to become binding on that
basis would make them easier to enforce than other contracts, con-
174. Id.
175. Id. at 195.
176. Id. at 191.
177. Id. at 193-94.




trary to the Arbitration Act's purpose. 180
In Miller v. Prosperity Bank, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered
whether a trial court had properly denied a motion to continue a sum-
mary judgment hearing on the ground that the party had not received the
required twenty-one days' notice of the hearing.181 In this case, the ap-
pellee's attorney had sent a timely notice of the hearing by certified mail,
which the appellant did not claim. The court held that this notice was
sufficient because the appellant admitted being aware that service had
been attempted and that it was from the attorney's office, although she
purposely decided not to claim the mail and was not aware of the
contents.1
82
180. Id. (footnotes omitted).
181. Miller v. Prosperity Bank, 239 S.W.3d 440, 441 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
182. Id. at 442-44.
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